Theories of justice are not, taken by most mainstream practitioners to be anything like as general and underspecified as a framework of reasoning. Rather, these specialists seem determined to take us straightaway to some fairly detailed formula for social justice and to firm identification, with no indeterminacy of the nature of just social institutions.
Rawls's theory of justice illustrates this very well. There is a lot of critical reasoning, involving respectively the pre-eminence of fairness, the conception of the original position, the nature of representation that is involved in the exercise and the type of unanimity that is expected in the choice of institutional principles in the original position.
All such general reasoning takes us, we are assured, to quite clear-cut rules to follow as unambiguous principles of justice, with singular institutional implications. In the case of Rawlsian justicе, these principles primarily include the priority of liberty (the first principle), some requirements of procedural equality (first part of the second principle) and some demands of equity, combined with efficiency, in the form of giving precedence to promoting the interests and advantages of the worst-off group (the second part of the second principle).
With all this particularized delineation in Rawlsian theory, there need be no great fear of being accused of indecisiveness.
Where can some requirements of procedural equality be found in the case of Rawlsian justice?
Correct Answer: B. In the first part of the second principle.
Solution:The requirements of procedural equality in Rawlsian justice are specified in the first part of the second principle.
This principle focuses on ensuring that social and economic inequalities are arranged in a way that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.